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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RESTANI, Judge, Court of International Trade: 
 
The issue on appeal is whether the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter "U.S.S.G." or 
"Sentencing Guidelines") allow a downward adjustment in 
offense level for a defendant's minor role in a crime when 
the career offender provision applies. The district court held 
that because the Defendant was a career offender under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, the district court lacked authority to 
grant a minor role downward adjustment. The Defendant 
timely appealed. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The facts of this case are undisputed. Defendant Johnson 
and nine others were charged with conspiring to distribute 
more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) (1994) (distribution of controlled 
substances), under 21 U.S.C. S 846 (1994) (attempt and 
conspiracy) and 18 U.S.C. S 2 (1994) (aiders and abettors 
punished as principals). After reaching an agreement with 
the government, Johnson pled guilty on April 17, 1997, to 
the charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
less than 100 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
S 846 (1994). In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated, 
inter alia, that Johnson's timely acceptance of responsibility 
for his crime warranted a three-point downward departure 
in offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1(a)-(b) (May 
1997), and that Johnson's minor role in the conspiracy 
warranted a two-point downward adjustment in offense 
level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3B1.2(b) (May 1997). 
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The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), submitted 
to the district court by the Probation Office, attributing the 
sale of 0.4 grams of heroin to Johnson, tabulated Johnson's 
base offense level at 12, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c)(14) 
(May 1997) (drug offenses involving less than five grams of 
heroin). Johnson's adult criminal record includes two prior 
felony convictions, one for the manufacture and sale of a 
controlled dangerous substance, and one for armed 
robbery. The PSR concluded that this history defined 
Johnson as a career offender under U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1 (May 
1997),1 thereby increasing his offense level to 32. The PSR 
also recommended that the district court grant a three-level 
downward adjustment to Johnson for his acceptance of 
responsibility and timely cooperation with the prosecution, 
resulting in a total recommended offense level of 29. 
 
On August 28, 1997, the district court sentenced 
Johnson according to the PSR recommendations. The 
district court agreed that Johnson's base offense level of 12 
should be increased to 32 under the career offender 
provision, followed by a three-level reduction for acceptance 
of responsibility, with a final offense total of 29. Out of the 
corresponding sentencing range of 151 to 188 months' 
incarceration, U.S.S.G. S 5A, the court sentenced Johnson 
to 151 months, with three years' probation and $1,100 in 
fines. Defendant objected that the government's stipulation 
and the facts of the case also entitled him to a minor role 
adjustment. The district court agreed that Johnson's minor 
role would ordinarily warrant a downward adjustment, but 
concluded that the minor role adjustment does not apply to 
career offenders. 
 
On appeal, Johnson seeks a remand for re-sentencing, 
arguing that the district court erred as a matter of law 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Sentencing Guidelines provide, in relevant part: 
 
       A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least 
       eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant 
       offense of conviction, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a 
felony 
       that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense, 
       and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of 
       either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. 
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when it determined that the career offender provision, 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, precluded the court from granting him a 
downward minor role adjustment to his offense level. 
 
II. 
 
We subject the district court's interpretation and 
application of the Sentencing Guidelines to plenary review. 
United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 727 (3rd Cir. 
1996), cert. den., 117 S.Ct. 2413 (1997). The Sentencing 
Guidelines are read according to the canons of statutory 
interpretation. See United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 670- 
71 (3rd Cir. 1993). Here, we consider the plain language of 
the career offender provision, the legislative policy behind 
it, and its position within the sequence of Sentencing 
Guideline Application Instructions. See United States v. 
Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 879 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
 
Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to assure 
that career offenders be sentenced "to a term of 
imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized." 
28 U.S.C. S 994(h) (1994). Section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines implements Congress' mandate by providing a 
table dictating substantial prison terms for repeat violent 
offenders and repeat drug traffickers. See U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, 
Commentary, Background. 
 
The sequence of the Sentencing Guideline Application 
Instructions, U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1 (May 1997), indicates that 
downward adjustments are allowed only for acceptance of 
responsibility after career offender status is imposed. 
Subsection (a) directs the court to determine the applicable 
offense guideline. U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(a). Subsection (b) tells 
the court to determine the base offense level and to apply 
any appropriate specific offense characteristics. U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.1(b). Subsection (c) provides for adjustment of the 
base offense level as appropriate related to victim, role, and 
obstruction of justice (e.g., minor role adjustment). U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.1(c). Subsection (e)2 instructs the court to apply the 
acceptance of responsibility adjustment, where appropriate. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Subsection (d) pertains to the treatment of conspiracies to commit 
multiple offenses. U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(d). 
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U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(e). Subsection (f) directs the court to 
determine the defendant's criminal history category and to 
make any applicable adjustments under Part B of Chapter 
4. The "career offender adjustment" is such an adjustment. 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(f). Finally, subsection (g) directs that the 
court determine the appropriate sentencing guideline range 
from the table provided in Chapter Five based on the 
previously determined offense level and criminal history 
category. U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(g). The court reads these 
instructions as providing a sequence of steps for the court 
to follow in the order in which they appear. 
 
Section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that 
"[i]f the offense level for a career criminal from the table [set 
forth therein] is greater than the offense level otherwise 
applicable, the offense level from the table . . . shall apply. 
A career offender's criminal history category in every case 
shall be category VI." That section thus presupposes that 
the court has previously calculated the "offense level 
otherwise applicable" which has incorporated any reduction 
for the defendant's role in the offense. If that offense level, 
as here, is lower than the offense level stated in the 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1 table, the table's offense level must be 
used, along with a criminal history category of VI, in 
determining the applicable guideline range under Chapter 
5. 
 
With one express exception, whenever "the otherwise 
applicable offense level" is lower than the offense level in 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1's table, section 4B1.1 dictates the final 
offense level and criminal history category to be used in 
determining the guideline range. In 1989, Amendment 266 
added a footnote to U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, instructing courts as 
follows: "If an adjustment from S 3E1.1 (Acceptance of 
Responsibility) applies, decrease the offense level by 2 levels."3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Subsequently, Amendment 459 replaced the text of the footnote to 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1 with the following: 
 
       If an adjustment from S 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility) 
applies, 
       decrease the offense level by the number of levels corresponding to 
       that adjustment. 
 
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, App. C, 
Amendment 459 (effective Nov. 1, 1992). 
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United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 
App. C, Amendment 266 (effective Nov. 1, 1989). The 
purpose of the amendment was "to provide an incentive for 
the acceptance of responsibility by defendants subject to 
the career offender provision." Id. In light of the Sentencing 
Commission's overall intent to impose substantial prison 
terms on repeat violent offenders and repeat drug 
traffickers, the fact that no other reductions are provided 
for after the career offender adjustment is evidence that, at 
that juncture, downward adjustments are allowed only for 
acceptance of responsibility. See Wong, 3 F.3d at 670-671 
("[E]xpressio unius est exclusio alterius."). 
 
If the sequence of the statutory provisions were arbitrary, 
the additional provision for an acceptance of responsibility 
reduction would have been unnecessary, as courts could 
simply have applied U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(e) after U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.1(f) with the same effect. The treatment of acceptance 
of responsibility thus attests to the drafters' understanding 
of the provisions as an ordered list. In the case of a career 
offender, U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(f) directs the court to adjust the 
defendant's offense level in accordance with U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.1 after any minor role adjustment is made. Other 
adjustments are thus effectively overwritten by the 
magnitude of the career offender upward adjustment. 4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The other Circuit Courts of Appeals which have addressed the issue 
agree that minor role downward adjustments do not apply to the career 
offender context. See United States v. Morales-Diaz, 925 F.2d, 535, 540 
(1st Cir. 1991) (mitigating role reductions do not apply to career 
offenders); United States v. Ward, 144 F.3d 1024, 1036 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(absent express authorization, "role in the offense" adjustments do not 
apply to career offender offense levels); United States v. Beltran, 122 
F.3d 
1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 1997) (mitigating role adjustments "simply do not 
apply in the career offender context"); United States v. McCoy, 23 F.3d 
216, 218 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowance of minor role adjustments would 
conflict with Congress' desire for maximum sentence); United States v. 
Griffin, 109 F.3d 706, 708 (11th Cir. 1997) (Sentencing Guideline 
provisions for role reductions do not apply to the statutory mandatory 
minimum term given to a career offender); but see United States v. 
Reyes, 1992 WL 110987, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (downward adjustments 
granted for minor role and acceptance of responsibility). 
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III. 
 
Defendant also contends that the silence of U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.1 as to the application of minor role adjustments 
means that the rule of lenity applies. The court disagrees. 
The rule of lenity dictates that "ambiguity concerning the 
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of 
lenity [to the defendant]." Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 
808, 812 (1971). The rule applies only where a statute is 
found to be ambiguous upon review of "the text, structure, 
legislative history, and policies behind the statute," 
Schneider, 14 F.3d at 879, not "at the beginning of the 
process of construction, ` "as an overriding consideration of 
being lenient to wrongdoers," ' " United States v. Rodriguez, 
961 F.2d 1089, 1093-94 (3rd Cir. 1992) (quoting Chapman 
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (quoting 
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961))). If the 
statute is not ambiguous, then the statute's plain language 
shall apply. United States v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 984 (3rd 
Cir. 1993). Because there is nothing ambiguous in the 
statute or the legislative history as to the application of the 
career offender provision, the rule of lenity does not apply. 
Section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines does not give 
ambiguous instructions for applying minor role 
adjustments; it does not mention them at all. 
 
IV. 
 
Defendant further directs the court to United States v. 
Shoupe, 35 F.3d 835 (3rd Cir. 1994), and United States v. 
Rivers, 50 F.3d 1126 (2nd Cir. 1995), as examples of 
downward adjustments granted to career offenders for 
reasons other than acceptance of responsibility. These 
cases are inapposite. Shoupe and Rivers affirm a sentencing 
judge's discretion under U.S.S.G. S 4A1.3 (Nov. 1993 and 
1994) to depart downward in offense level and criminal 
history category where a career offender's formal criminal 
history misrepresents the defendant's actual criminal past 
and probability of recidivism. Shoupe, 35 F.3d at 838-39 
(may depart where youth and other factors mitigate weight 
of earlier felonies); Rivers, 50 F.3d at 1127-28, 1131 
(departure appropriate where remoteness of prior history 
diminishes likelihood of recidivism). There is no indication 
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that the district court misperceived its discretion to depart 
from the guidelines in an appropriate case. Here, the court 
simply and properly declined to apply a minor offense 
adjustment after applying the career offender provision. The 
court's intention was to apply the guidelines, not to depart 
from them. 
 
V. 
 
The district court did not err in its application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines in this case. Based on the plain 
language of the Sentencing Guidelines, their legislative 
history, and the sequence of the relevant provisions, we 
affirm the district court's holding that minor role downward 
adjustments do not apply to career offenders. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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